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JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction of this appeal is conferred upon the Court
of Appeals by Sections 77-35-26(2)(a) and 78-2a-3(2)(f), Utah
Code (1988).
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS BELOW
Defendant William Clifford Bartley ("Bartley") was
convicted of theft, a third degree felony, after a jury trial on
April 12-13, 1988. The Seventh District Court, Honorable Boyd
Bunnell presiding (the "District Court"), entered its final
Findings, Judgment and Commitment on May 10, 1988, committing
Bartley to the Utah State Prison.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
The following issues are presented in this appeal:
1.

Can peace officers set up a road block when there

is no evidence that a crime has been committed?
2.

Does driving a pickup pulling a trailer with tanks

on it on a county road at night, when there is no evidence that a
crime has been committed, give rise to an "articulable suspicion"
sufficient to justify a stop?
3.

When the above facts are combined with an odor of

gas condensate, but there is still no evidence of the commission
of a crime, is there probable cause to arrest?
4.

Did the District Court err in admitting evidence

of Bartley's possession of a concealed handgun at the time of
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arrest?
5.

Did the District Court err in admitting testimony

that confiscated vehicles and trailers had disappeared from the
impound yard, when no evidence connects Bartley to the
disappearance?
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
Interpretation of the following constitutional
provisions, statutes and rules is determinative of this appeal:
Constitutional Provisions
The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not
be violated . . . .
U. S. Constitution, Amend. IV
The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures shall not
be violated . . . .
Utah Constitution, Article I, Sec. 14
Statutes
A peace officer may stop any person in a
public place when
he has a
reasonable
suspicion to believe he has committed or is
in the act of committing or is attempting to
commit a public offense and may demand his
name, address and an explanation of his
actions.
Section 77-7-15, Utah Code (1988)
A peace officer may . . . , without
arrest a person:
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warrant,

(2) When he has reasonable cause to believe
a felony
has
been committed
and
has
reasonable cause to believe that the person
arrested has committed it . . • .
Section 77-7-2(2), Utah Code (1988)
Rules
Evidence which.
admissible.

Is

not

relevant

is

not

Rule 402, Utah Rules of Evidence
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded
if it's probative value is substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice,
confusion of the issues, or misleading the
jury, or by consideration of undue delay,
waste of time or needless presentation of
cumulative evidence.
Rule 403, Utah Rules of Evidence
(a) Character evidence generally.
Evidence
of a person's character or a trait of his
character is not admissible for the purpose
of proving that
he acted in conformity
therewith on a particular occasion, except:
(1) Character of accused.
Evidence of
a pertinent trait
of his character
offered by an
accused, or by
the
prosecution to rebut the same;

(b) Other crimes, wrongs, or acts. Evidence
of other crimes, wrongs or acts is not
admissible to prove the character of a person
in order to show that he acted in conformity
therewith.
It may, however, be admissible
for other purposes, such as proof of motive,
opportunity,
intent,
preparation,
plan,
knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or
accident.
Rule 404, Utah Rules of Evidence
4

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
This is an appeal from the final Findings, Judgment: and
Commitment entered by the District Court on May 10, 1988,
following a jury trial on April 12-13, 19 88.

Bartley was

convicted at the trial of the theft of gas condensate or
"dripgas" having a value of more than $250.00, but less than
$1,000.00, from Wintershall Oil & Gas, on or about December 27,
1986.
The trial followed a hearing on a Motion to Suppress,
first heard with respect to defendant Jay Charles Wade ("Wade")
on December 1, 1987, (see Transcript of Hearing on Motion to
Suppress dated December 1, 1987, hereinafter referred to as
"Motion Tr.), and heard on the same facts with respect to Bartley
on April 12, 19 88, (see Trial Transcript, Volume I, pp. 2-3,
hereinafter referred to as the "Trial Tr. M ).

The Motion to

Suppress was based upon the violation of the constitutional
prohibition against unreasonable search and seizures.
District Court denied the motion.

The

Counsel for Bartley and Wade

objected at trial to the introduction of evidence gained pursuant
to the stop and subsequent arrest, but those objections were
overruled.

Trial Tr. I at 64, Trial Tr. II at 127.
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Statement of Facts
San Juan County is located in the Southeastern corner
of Utah.

U. S. Highway 191 runs South from Monticello, Utah, to

Blanding, Utah, Bluff, Utah and then South into Arizona.

U. S.

Highway 666 runs East from Monticello to Dove Creek and Cortez,
Colorado.

State Roads 163 and 262 run East from Bluff to

Montezuma Creek and Aneth.
The portion of San Juan County lying East of U. S.
Highway 191, South of U. S. Highway 666, and North of State Roads
163 and 262 is full of farms and ranches, a portion of the Navajo
Indian Reservation and producing oil fields. A county road
connects at the Utah-Colorado state line with a road from Dove
Creek, Colorado, and runs generally South and West across Bug
Point, Squaw Point, into Patterson Canyon, and on to Perkins
Ranch.

Trial Tr. Ill at 250-251.

goes West to Blanding, Utah.
Montezuma Creek, Utah.

The road then forks. One fork

The other proceeds South to

Motion Tr. at 6-7, Trial Tr. I at 58-59.

Both Wade and Bartley live in the North end of the area served by
this road.

Trial Tr. Ill at 325-327.

The county road is used by local farmers, ranchers and
Navajos in the Hatch and Montezuma Creek areas.
67, Trial Tr. I at 58-59.

Motion Tr. at

It is also used by several oil

companies for access to oil and gas wells in eastern San Juan
County.

When gas from some of the wells is compressed for
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delivery into a pipeline, a condensate is formed, often referred
to as dripgas.

Trial Tr. Ill at 257. There are other oil fields

in San Juan County from which dripgas is produced, including the
Lisbon oil field between Monticello and Moab.
69.

Trial Tr. I at 68-

Dripgas can be burned as fuel in internal combustion engines

and had been so used by one of the state's witnesses.

Trial Tr.

Ill at 271. Another witness for the state testified that a mine
in the area of the Lisbon oil field used dripgas in its mining
equipment.

Trial Tr. Ill at 292-294.

The San Juan County Sheriff's office had received
reports of theft of dripgas from the Patterson Canyon area in
19 86, but had not followed up on the reports.

Motion Tr. at 10.

Then, on December 26, 1986, at about 10:30 p.m.the Sheriff's
Office received a report that three pickups with tanks and
trailers were seen going South on the county road near Bug Point.
Motion Tr. at 3.

Sheriff Rigby Wright ("Wright") and Jack Kirby

("Kirby"), his chief deputy, decided to investigate.

Motion Tr.

at 3.
Wright and Kirby drove to Dove Creek, then drove South
on the San Juan County road to what Wright referred to as the
"Long place", which was about ten miles North of the oil wells.
Motion Tr. at 4, Trial Tr. I at 61. They there conferred with
Robert Knuckles ("Knuckles") and Charles Williams ("Williams"),
two oil field service workers.

Trial Tr. I at 60. At this time
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there was still no evidence that any crime had been committed.
Motion Tr. at 14. Knuckles and Williams were instructed to stay
at the Long place.

Trial Tr, I at 61.

Wright and Kirby then proceeded South on the county
road about half the distance to the oil wells.
61.

Trial Tr. I at

They stopped their car in the middle of a downward curving

section of the road at about 12:30 a.m.

Trial Tr. I at 62r 65.

The car driven by Wright and Kirby had no overhead lights and was
equipped only with a red spotlight.
stayed with the car.

Trial Tr. I at 63. Kirby

Trial Tr. I at 63. Wright walked on down

the road about 50 yards and stood in the trees. Motion Tr. at
11, Trial Tr. I at 63. They intended to stop every vehicle
coming up the road.

Motion Tr. at 9-10.

Both Wright and Kirby testified that they saw three
sets of headlights coming up the road.

Trial Tr. I at 62, Trial

Tr. II at 127-128. Kirby stopped the first vehicle, a Ford
vehicle pulling a trailer with three tanks on it.
63.

That vehicle was driven by Wade.

Trial Tr. I at

Trial Tr. I at 63. The

second vehicle, a Dodge pickup pulling a trailer with a tank on
it, was driven by Hartley.

Trial Tr. I at 63.

Bartley stopped

his truck behind Wade, got out of the pickup and began walking up
the road toward the Sheriff's car.

Trial Tr. I at 66. Wright

then stepped out of the trees and told Bartley to stop.
Tr. I at 66.

Trial

The third set of headlights never came around the
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corner.

Motion Tr. at 12.
After the vehicles were stopped, both Wright and Kirby

observed a "dripgas" odor.

Motion Tr. at 11, Trial Tr. I at 67-

68, Trial Tr. II at 131. Wright compared the odor with what he
had smelled out by the Lisbon oil field.

Trial Tr. I at 68-69.

Kirby compared the odor with the smell in oil fields in Oklahoma
where he had worked earlier in his life.
133.

Trial Tr. il at 131-

Both Wade and Bartley were immediately placed under arrest

and put in the back of the car

Motion Tr. at 12. Neither was

asked to explain his presence on the road.

Motion Tr. at 11-12.

The state was permitted, over Bartley1s objection, to introduce
evidence that Bartley had a handgun tucked in his pants when he
was arrested.

Trial Tr. I at 80-82, Trial Tr. II at 128.

Bartley had been charged in justice court with carrying a
concealed dangerous weapon, but was never convicted.

See Plea

Agreement in Civil No. 704, 739 and 742, at pages 167-171 of the
Record.
After Wade and Bartley had been arrested, the sherifffs
office was instructed to contact Knuckles and Williams and tell
them to come on down.

Trial Tr. II at 177-178. Wright and Kirby

then spent about an hour looking for the "third vehicle", which
they never found.

Trial Tr. I at 70.

They then drove to the

area of the wells, where they met Knuckles and Williams.
Tr. I at 7 0-71.

Trial

Knuckles and Williams showed them a tank from
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which dripgas was missing.

Trial Tr. I at 7 0-71.

Wade and Hartley were then taken to the San Juan County
Jail.

Trial Tr. I at 78, Trial Tr. II at 134. Their clothing

was confiscated as evidence.
134,

Trial Tr. I at 78, Trial Tr. II at

At trial, samples from clothing stains were later compared

with dripgas samples from the well.

Trial Tr. II at 225-229.

Their boots were compared with boot prints at the well site and a
picture of Wade's trailer tire was compared with a picture of a
tire track at the well site.
Ill at 240-246.

Trial Tr. II at 221-225, Trial Tr.

Their pickups and trailers were impounded in

Monticello, and pictures were taken of them.
Trial Tr. II at 141-142.

Trial Tr. I at 78,

Samples were not taken from the tanks

on December 27, 1986, and on the morning of December 28, 1986,
the pickups, trailers and tanks were gone.
121.

Trial Tr. I at 114-

The District Court permitted, over Bartley's objection,

testimony that the pickups and trailers had been unlawfully
removed from the impound yard.

Trial Tr. I at 114-122. Bartley

had been charged with tampering with evidence in connection with
that disappearance, but the charges were dismissed at the
preliminary hearing.

See Plea Agreement in Civil No. 7 04, 7 39

and 742, pp. 167-171 of the Record.
Wade and Bartley introduced testimony that the
condensate they were transporting had been purchased by Bartley
from Alva Rockwell, who had obtained it in the area of the Lisbon
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oil field.

Trial Tr. Ill at 306-308.

Rockwell testified that he

left the tank and trailer with the condensate on State Road 9 5
near Blanding, Utah.

Trial Tr. Ill at 321-322. Wade testified

that on the evening of December 26, 1986, Bartley came to his
house, told him that he had been bringing the condensate up from
Blanding on the county road, but had been unable to pull the load
up a hill.

Trial Tr. Ill at 326-328. He requested Wade's help.

Trial Tr. Ill at 328. Wade testified that, after eating dinner,
he took his pickup and trailer down with Bartley, that they
pumped some of the condensate into his tanks, and headed up the
hill.

Trial Tr. Ill at 328-330.

Several miles up the road, they

were stopped by Wright and Kirby.

Trial Tr. Ill at 330-331.

Bartley had previously been convicted of a felony theft
in Colorado, and did not take the stand.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Officers Wright and Kirby set up what amounted to a
roadblock on a county road that serves farms, ranches, Navajos
and oil field traffic.

This was not a routine roadblock to check

licenses or vehicle safety.

The peace officers intended to stop

every traveler in order to find someone who had stolen dripgas.
However, there was no evidence that any dripgas had been stolen,
and the officers had only a "hunch" that anyone on the road at
that time of night was up to no good.
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Even if it is assumed that officers Wright and Kirby
intended only to stop vehicles matching the description of the
vehicles going into the canyon, they were still acting on nothing
more than a "hunch".

The officers had no way of distinguishing

Wade and Bartley from ranchers hauling water for their cows, or
farmers hauling fuel for their farm implements.

They had no

evidence that a crime had been committed until more than an hour
later.
If the initial stop was illegal, there is no need to
examine the lawfulness of the arrest.

However, arrest requires a

finding of probable cause that a crime had been committed.

At

this time the officers knew only that Wade and Bartley possessed
something that smelled like dripgas.

They had no evidence that

the dripgas had been illegally obtained.
The District Court's decision to admit testimony that
Bartley was carrying a handgun when stopped added nothing
relevant to the trial of the case and could serve only to
persuade the jury that Bartley was a "criminal".

Likewise, the

testimony concerning disappearance of the impounded vehicles
added nothing to the jury's understanding of the case and served
only to suggest that Bartley was involved in that crime, tending
to fortify the impression that he is likely to commit a crime.
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ARGUMENT
I.

THE PEACE OFFICERS' USE OF A ROADBLOCK
TO APPREHEND SUSPECTS OF A PARTICULAR
CRIME WAS NOT SUPPORTED BY STRONG
EVIDENCE THAT A CRIME HAD ACTUALLY
OCCURRED.

The road block set up by Officers Wright and Kirby in
this case is different from the kind approved in dicta by the U.
S. Supreme Court in Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979).l
Such roadblocks involve routine stops of every driver, or every
fifth driver, for a short period of time to check license and
registration.

The officer's discretion to select individuals for

investigation is serverely limited.
This case involves a roadblock to stop every vehicle on
a particular road because of the officers1 suspicion that anyone
on that road at that time of night would bear some investigation.
We have not uncovered any Utah cases in which the power of the
police to establish such roadblocks is discussed.

However, cases

in other jurisdictions make clear that such roadblocks are
approved only in cases of the highest emergency.
In Washington v. Silvernail, 25 Wash. App. 185, 605
P.2d 1279 (1980) cert, denied, 449 U.S. 843 (1980), the police
were notified of an assault and burglary by the victim.

The

lSome states have invalidated such roadblocks under state
constitutional provisions. Seattle v. Mesiani, 110 Wash. 2d 454,
755 P.2d 775 (1988); Idaho v. Henderson, 114 Idaho 293, 756 P.2d
1057 (1988). But see Ingersoll v. Palmer, 43 Cal. 3d 1321, 743
P.2d 1299 (1987).
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victim*s report of the perpetrator *s statements suggested they
would be using the ferry.

The police then set up a roadblock at

the ferry dock and searched all cars on the ferry, discovering
evidence identifying the perpetrators.
In affirming the conviction, the Court stated:
Roadblocks to capture fleeing suspects, therefore,
can only be upheld in cases of the highest
emergency . . . .
In the present case, the officers had probable
cause to believe a serious felony had been
committed. Information about the nature of the
crime and the means of flight had been reliably
reported by the victim. This information was
coupled with special circumstances which justified
the officers' action at the ferry dock: the crime
was violent; it was highly unlikely that the
felons were on the ferry; and there was only one
means of departing the ferry. There was,
therefore, a reasonable likelihood of success and
a minimal intrusion on the traveling public.
Id.t 25 Wash. App. 185, 605 P.2d 1279 at 1283.
The Alaska Supreme Court amplified on the requirements
for such roadblocks in Lacy v. Alaska, 608 P.2d 19 (1980):
[W]hile the roadblock tactic as compared to the
typical stop and frisk situation, requires more
evidence that a crime has occurred, by its very
nature it requires less evidence that any
particular vehicle stopped is occupied by the
perpetrator of that crime. (Emphasis in
original.}
Id., 608 P.2d 19 at 21, quoting with approval from 3 W. LaFave,
Search and Seizure 9.5 at 142-143 (1978) .
For the kind of roadblock set up by Wright and Kirby,
there must be more evidence that a crime was committed than with
14

an investigatory stop.

The crime must be a serious felony.

of these requirements is met in this case.

None

The peace officers

had no evidence that a crime had been committed except their own
speculation.

The crime was a non-violent theft.

The officer had

no knowledge that the value o:f the property stolen would cause
the theft to amount to a felony.
In each search and seizure case, a balance must be
drawn between the interest in apprehending the guilty and the
public's right to be secure in their property.

In this case, the

peace officers incorrectly concluded that the balance was tilted
to setting up a roadblock.

However, none of the factors

justifying a roadblock were present.
II.

The roadblock was unlawful.

THE PEACE OFFICERS HAD NO REASONABLE
SUSPICION THAT BARTLEY HAD COMMITTED
A CRIME.

The Utah rule governing investigatory stops is codified
in Section 77-7-15, Utah Code (1988).

That rule developed over

the years as the Utah Supreme Court interpreted the search and
seizure provisions of the Utah and U. S. Constitutions.

The law

requires a reasonable, articulable suspicion by the peace officer
that the person stopped has committed a public offense.
This reasonable suspicion standard has been applied in
State v. Swanigan, 699 P.2d 718 (Utah 1985) (description of two
men seen in area by another officer two hours previously
insufficient to give officer reasonable suspicion to stop two men
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walking at 1:40 a.m. three blocks from burglary), State v.
Carpena, 714 P.2d 674 (Utah 1986) (officer lacked reasonable
suspicion to stop auto with out-of-state plates moving slowly at
3:00 a.m. through neighborhood where rash of burglaries had
recently occurred), and State v. Mendoza, 748 P.2d 181 (Utah
1987) (Mexican appearance, California plates, route, time,
"erratic" driving with police car tailing two to six feet behind,
and nervous behavior after stop insufficient for reasonable
suspicion).
This Court has interpreted the reasonable suspicion
standard in State v. Trujillo, 739 P.2d 85 (Utah App. 1987) (late
hour, high crime area, nervous conduct and "suspicious" nylon
knapsack insufficient to justify stop) and State v. Baird, 763
P.2d 1214 (Utah App. 1988) (something funny about out-of-state
license plate insufficient).
In State v. Baumgaertel, 762 P.2d 2 (Utah App. 1988),
this Court analyzed its prior decisions and those of the Utah
Supreme Court and concluded that "travelling in a lawful manner
at a late hour in a high crime area"2 is not enough to support an
investigatory stop.

The stop was justified, however, because the

car had entered the parking lot of Ernie's Automotive eight hours
after the shop had closed, and clearly had no legitimate reason
to be there.

2ld., 762 P.2d 2 at 4
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These cases make clear that Wade and Bartley could not
be stopped just because they were driving late at night through
an area where thefts had recently occurred.

One searches in vain

for additional factors to elevate the officers' "hunch" to a
reasonable, articulable suspicion.

The peace officers could not

possibly have observed the tank before the stop.

Even if they

had, there is nothing out of the ordinary about pickups, trailers
and tanks on a county road serving the Navajo reservation, farms,
ranches, and the oil field.

If this stop was justified, any

rancher carrying water to his cows, any Navajo hauling water to
his hogan, or any farmer hauling fuel for his tractor is subject
to being stopped when he drives on this county road.

Such an

intrusion on the security of the people is not justified.
As a natural consequence of the unlawfulness of the
investigatory stop, all evidence obtained pursuant thereto must
be excluded, including the evidence obtained pursuant to the
subsequent arrest.
III.

THE ARREST WAS NOT SUPPORTED BY PROBABLE
CAUSE.

If the initial investigatory stop was invalid, it is
unnecessary to examine the propriety of the arrest, since an
arrest cannot be supported by evidence unlawfully obtained.3

The

arrest, however, must be justified by reasonable, probable cause,

3state v. Baird, 763 P.2d 1214 (Utah App. 1988)
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not just a reasonable, articulable suspicion.4

it must appear

from the evidence then available to the officer that the accused,
more likely than not, had committed a felony.

The officers in

this case knew only 1) that it was 1:00 a.m., 2) that there had
been thefts of dripgas in the anea, and 3) that there was a smell
like that of dripgas around ±tie ^ehxcies..

The peace officers

were relying on their experience in other oil fields with other
condensate in concluding thai: th^ tanks carried dripgas. More
importantly, they concluded that the dripgas could not have been
legally obtained.

There is no evidence in the record, however,

showing that condensate or dripgas cannot be lawfully purchased.
The statefs own witness. Knuckles, testified that dripgas was
available in Farmington, New Mexico, and he had used dripgas in
his vehicle until it damaged his engine.
Wright and Kirby assumed that what they smelled was
dripgas, that the dripgas had been stolen, and that it had been
stolen from one of the oil fields in the area.

However, they had

no evidence beyond their own conjecture that any dripgas had been
stolen, or that Wade and Bartley had stolen it.
Since the arrest was not supported by probable or
reasonable cause, the evidence obtained pursuant thereto should
have been excluded.

4section 77-7-2(2), Utah Code (1988)
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IV.

THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING
EVIDENCE OF LITTLE OR NO RELEVANCE WITH
A HIGH PROBABILITY OF PREJUDICING THE JURY

The District Court permitted, over Bartleyfs objection
the introduction of evidence that Bartley put a gun in his pants
when he was stopped on a county road at 1:00 a.m., by an
unidentified vehicle.

That xailing is incorrect.

The jury is

entitled to hear all relevantS evidence whose relevance outweighs
its possible prejudicial effect.6
The jury was charged with determining whether Bartley
had committed a nonviolent theft of gas condensate worth less
than $1,000.00, which had been left in a tank in eastern San Juan
County.

It was not charged with determining whether he had used

a firearm in committing a crime, or whether he unlawfully
possessed a firearm.7
The firearm had nothing whatsoever to do with the
theft.

The only conceivable relevance is that perhaps people who

are carrying a gun are more likely to have recently committed a
crime than people who are not carrying a gun.

The prosecution

did not present any statistical evidence to support this
proposition, perhaps because the evidence would be character
5Rule 402, Utah Rules of Evidence.
6Rule 403, Utah Rules of Evidence.
^Carrying a concealed loaded firearm or carrying a loaded
firearm in a vehicle are crimes. See Section 76-10-504 and
505, Utah Code (1988).
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evidence of a type prohibited by Ruie 404 of the Utah Rules of
Evidence.
In contrast to the minimal or nonexistent relevance of
Bartley's possession of a handgun stands the very real prospect
of juror bias when presented with evidence that the accused
carried a gun in his belt.

The evidence tends to portray Bartley

as a lawless, gunslinger type.

The jury might very well have

been affected by such a portrayal.

In the face of possible

significant juror bias from marginally relevant evidence, the
proper approach, under Rule 403, is to exclude the evidence.
This the District Court failed to do.
The District Court erred even more seriously when it
permitted the introduction of evidence about the disappearance of
the trucks, tanks and trailers from the impound yard.

The

District Court justified its ruling by stating that he had heard
too many arguments about lack of evidence and that defense
counsel could not have it both ways.

That argument would have

some value if explaining why evidence is lacking makes up in some
way for its absence.

The plain truth was that the sheriff's

office did not have samples from the tanks. Why it did not may
have been relevant to an inquiry about police procedures, but it
was not relevant to Bartleyfs guilt.
The unspoken assumption, which the jury could not
possibly have missed, is that Bartley or someone under his
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direction, had engineered the disappearance of the vehicles.

It

necessarily followed that he would not have done so unless there
was evidence in or on the vehicles tending to implicate him.
However, the prosecution had insufficient evidence that Bartley
had been involved in the disappearance to bind him over from
circuit court.
The Utah Supreme Court reversed a criminal conviction
in State v. Holder, 694 P.2d 583 (1984) for erroneous admission
of evidence of other crimes committed by the defendant.

In so

doing, it stated that:
Such evidence of the commission of other crimes
must be used with extreme caution because of the
prejudicial effect it may have on the trier of
fact. (Citation omitted) . . . .
In light of the marginal probative value of the
robbery evidence and of the generally recognized
danger that jurors hearing evidence of another
crime may be unduly prejudiced against them, we
hold that the trial judge abused his discretion
under Rule 45 of the Utah Rules of Evidence.
Id. 699 P.2d 583 at 584-585.
The District Court had a duty to exclude evidence that
did not tend to show that Bartley had or had not committed the
theft with which he was charged.

It had a duty to exclude

evidence whose prejudicial impact far exceeded its relevance.
failed to do so when it permitted testimony that Bartley had
carried a concealed weapon, and testimony implying that Bartley
had tampered with evidence, when the State in fact had no
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It

evidence sufficient to bind Bartley over on that charge.
Conclusion
The District Court erred in denying the motion to
suppress and admitting evidence gathered pursuant to an unlawful
roadblock, investigatory stop and arrest.

It also erroneously

admitted prejudicial evidence with little or no probative value*
This Court should reverse and remand this case for a new trial
with directions to the District Court to grant the Motion to
Suppress and exclude the other prejudicial evidence.
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